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Abstract 
We characterize free mobility equilibrium in a common pool resource setting with two localities. We find that adopting 
a decentralized management in just one locality increases agents' welfare not only in the regulated locality but in the 
unregulated locality as well.
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     1. Introduction
We study the common pool resource (CPR hereafter) problem with free mobility, i.e.
agents move across localities without cost as in a Tiebout (1956) economy1. The focus of
this paper is to extend the CPR model to situations where agents in multiple localities
are free to choose their place to live and extract resources. Ostrom (1990) highlights the
importance of clearly dened boundaries for successful self-governance in the commons.
However, in and out population migration may be a signicant factor in resource use
across communities. Examples of commons with multiple locations include international
sheries or pasturelands under extensive grazing.
We consider two possible management regimes for each locality, both in exogenous
and endogenous institutional settings. In some localities common resources may be un-
regulated. Alternatively, resources may be regulated by a sanctioning mechanism where
mutual monitoring and sanctioning opportunities allow agents to obtain the socially opti-
mal use level2. Casari and Plott (2003) study a decentralized sanctioning3 system called
\Carte di Regola" for managing the common properties in Alpine villages. We consider
this sanctioning system as an example of an institution that has a historical precedence
and that has been shown to restore the eciency in closed communities. The research
question is: How does free mobility aect the performance of the sanctioning system? If
one locality is regulated and the other is not, would the sanctioning institution withstand
the migratory pressure from the neighboring unregulated locality? Would it be possible
to prevent \the tragedy of the commons" (e.g., Hardin, 1968)?
To characterize a free mobility equilibrium, we use the Tiebout equilibrium concept
dened as a partitioning of agents into localities, where no single agent wants to move
from the current position to join the other existing localities (e.g., Tiebout, 1956, Westho,
1977).
We nd that a locality with sanctions can sustain the ecient use level and prevent
over-use under free mobility as long as the community adjusts its harvesting target in
response to migratory pressure from the unregulated locality and evasion from sanctions
is impossible. Moreover, the locality with no regulation experiences a positive externality
from the regulated locality because the latter accommodates more people. We also show
that if the institutions are endogenous, i.e. agents in each locality vote for the regulatory
regime, the sanctioning system is adopted as long as it is Pareto-improving.
1See Scotchmer (2002) for the review of literature on local public good economies.
2Sanctions have been shown to resolve social problems in CPR, public good, and truth-telling settings
(e.g., Casari and Plott, 2003, Fehr and G achter, 2000, S anchez-Pag es and Vorsatz, 2007).
3In this sanctioning system, villagers agreed among themselves and set up a contract with the approval
of the regional government, called \Carte di Regola". The contract specied a system for monitoring
and sanctioning those exceeding the agreed upon and publicly known use level. The village court could
sentence over-users extracting above the harvesting limit. Violators paid a ne in proportion to the extra
use. Any community member could report a violation. The share of the ne usually went to the person
discovering the violation which encouraged monitoring.
1Previous studies on the resource allocation across multiple sites focus on the private
property rights. De Meza and Gould (1992) study a two-sector economy with N sites
and a xed amount of labor mobile among sites and between sectors, but assuming costly
enforcement. Unlike our paper, they nd that enclosure introduced as an alternative
regime to the open access may bring inecient outcomes because of either too much or too
little enforcement of private property rights. Chichilnisky (1994) nds resource allocation
ineciency with trade between two asymmetric regions, where one region has ill-dened
property rights and the other maintains private property rights of the resource use. Similar
to our paper, this model of the eect of trade on the resource use examines a two-locality
situation. However, management regimes are treated as exogenous. Threshold models
of renewable resource management (Copeland 2005) consider endogenous management
regimes, in that the resource is open access until the benets of resource management
are below the xed cost of maintaining the institution. Once the threshold has passed,
resource management is adopted. These models also nd a possible welfare-reducing eect
of trade. Sanchirico and Wilen (1999, 2005) develop a dynamic model of optimal spatial
resource management, which captures sh movement according to their biological patterns
as well as shermen's migration in response to changes in protability. Yet, they ignore
the institutional aspect since all localities are assumed to have open access. None of the
above studies exploit a decentralized sanctioning mechanism as an alternative institution
in the economy with multiple sites.
2. Basic CPR Model
As a benchmark, we review the basic CPR model with one locality. A nite number
N of identical agents with endowment e each, simultaneously decide on the amount of
harvest xi from the common pool, where i  N is the agent's index. Let X =
PN
i=1 xi be
the total appropriation, and f(X) be a concave production function. For simplicity, we
assume f(X) = a  X   b  X2, where a and b are positive constants. The cost per unit of
harvest is denoted by c. Then each agent i0s prot is given by i = e cxi+(xi=X)f(X).
2.1 Unregulated locality
If the locality is unregulated, denoted by U, then the total appropriation in the sym-
metric Nash equilibrium is given by (i.e. Falk et al., 2002):
X
U = (a   c)  N=b  (N + 1) (1)
which is higher than the social optimum dened as follows:
X
opt = (a   c)=2  b (2)
if N > 1. Let xopt  Xopt=N = (a   c)=2  b  N denote per capita social optimum. From
equation (1) the Nash equilibrium per person prot in the unregulated locality is given
by U
i = e + (a   c)2=b  (N + 1)2.
22.2 Locality with sanctions
The model with sanctions (Casari and Plott, 2003) assumes that the community re-
stricts per agent harvesting to the threshold amount, , which targets the socially optimal
harvesting level. We assume identical agents, perfect and costly monitoring, and no pos-
sibility of sanction evasion. There are two steps in the CPR sanctioning game. Once
the harvesting threshold in the regulated community is set according to the population
level, each agent i decides on a harvesting level, xi. Next, after observing total group use,
each agent may choose to inspect other agents. By paying inspection fee, k, the inspector
may obtain exact information about the harvesting decision of one other member. In the
case of simultaneous inspections by multiple agents, one person is randomly chosen as
the inspector. Harvesting beyond the threshold costs an individual a ne payment if any
other member of the community discovers the excessive use. The model assumes perfect
enforcement, so that the ne is collected with certainty once the excessive user is detected.
For each excess harvested unit a person pays a unitary ne, h. The total ne, (x )h, is
a direct transfer to the inspector who discovers the exceeded use. We use index R for the
regulation, i.e sanctions. Therefore, when locality is regulated by the sanctioning mecha-




where Ii = 1 if
P
j6=i Iij > 1, and Ii = 0 otherwise. Here mi is the ne that agent i pays if
inspected by agent j, where i 6= j and mj   k, is the revenue generated by agent i from
monitoring of agent j. Iij = 1 if i inspects j and Iij = 0 otherwise. Casari and Plott
(2003) establish the following:
Proposition 1 Suppose a locality has a sanctioning mechanism, where the threshold is
set as  = xopt   k=h   ", with " > 0 small enough and the unit ne is set as h =
a   c   xopt  (N + 1)  b. Then this mechanism supports the socially optimal level of
harvesting as the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, XR = Xopt. In this equilibrium,
every agent inspects and is being inspected with certainty.
From equation (2) the equilibrium per person prot in the regulated locality is given
by R
i = e+(a c)2=b4N  k. Note that, for any given population size N > 1, U
i (N) <
R
i (N) as long as k is small enough4. Therefore, each agent prefers the sanctioning regime
to no regulation.
3. CPR free mobility equilibrium
Now consider two communities with identical production functions, f(X). Let the
total population of the two localities be N. We assume free mobility, but perfect enforce-
ment of sanctions within the regulated locality, and examine two cases: exogenous and
endogenous institutions.
4The monitoring cost has to satisfy k  (a   c)2=b  (1=4  N   1=(1 + N)2):
33.1 Exogenous institutions and free mobility
First, we assume that regulatory regimes in each locality are exogenous. Also, we
assume that the harvesting threshold in a regulated locality is set optimally and adjusts
perfectly to the population level in the locality:  = (NR), as dened in Proposition
1. Further, the inspection cost is low enough so that the benets of the sanctioning
mechanism outweigh the costs of adopting it in a regulated locality for any population
level NR  N.
Consider a game where agents are free to move from one location to the other. First,
each agent chooses the locality j, j 2 (U;R), in which to harvest. Then, agents choose
their harvesting levels. The inspection decisions in the regulated locality then follow. In
order to obtain predictions with free mobility across two localities, we use the notion
of Tiebout equilibrium (Greenberg and Weber, 1986) often referred as a free mobility
equilibrium5. The free mobility equilibrium is a partition of population of agents into
localities, where no single agent wants to move from the current position to join the
other existing locality. In the free mobility equilibrium, two conditions must hold: (i)
all localities are inhabited and each agent's action is individually optimal within each
locality; (ii) no agent wants to move, i.e. each agent's prot in a chosen locality is at least
as high as the identical agent's prot in the other locality.
For our purposes, we need to add sequential structure to the model. Hence, we solve for
the free mobility equilibrium as the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game, where
the rst stage involves location choice and the second stage involves harvesting decisions
(followed by monitoring decisions in the locality with sanctions). In equilibrium, the
agents choose the localities in anticipation of the outcome of CPR game in the locality
with no regulation and the outcome of the sanctioning mechanism in the regulated locality.
Given that all agents are identical, the equilibrium then requires that agents split into
two localities in a way that per agent prots across two localities are equalized, so that
no agent wants to move.
It is straightforward to show that given all agents are identical, under symmetric
regimes agents split equally between two localities. With no regulation, both communities
over-use the resource. With the sanctions, both communities obtain the social optimum.
Interesting results are derived for the asymmetric institutions case, where one locality
adopts the sanctioning mechanism and the other locality is unregulated. The free mobility
equilibrium is characterized as follows:
Proposition 2 In the free mobility equilibrium with identical agents in one regulated and
one unregulated locality, the locality with sanctions accommodates more people than the
unregulated locality, NR > NU. Introduction of the sanctioning mechanism in one locality
constitutes a Pareto improvement.
5Two equilibrium concepts, Tiebout equilibrium and the core of coalition structure, are used in local
public goods models. Conley and Konishi (2002) present a Migration-proof Tiebout equilibrium as a
renement of the core concept.
4Proof: Note that in equilibrium, by the identical agents assumption, R
i = U
i , oth-
erwise an agent would want to move to the locality with higher prot. To prove that
NR > NU, we need to show that cases NR = NU and NR < NU both lead to a contra-
diction. Let N be the total population, NR + NU = N.
First, assume NR = NU = N=2. Refer to section to see that if NR = NU = N=2,
then R
i (N=2) > U




To show that NR < N=2 < NU also cannot be an equilibrium, note that R
i (n) and
U
i (n) are both strictly decreasing in population, n, residing in own locality: R
i =@n =
 (a   c)2=4  b  n2 < 0 and U
i =@n =  2(a   c)2=b  (n + 1)3 < 0. This implies that
R
i (NR < N=2) > R
i (N=2) > U
i (N=2) > U
i (NU > N=2). Contradiction. Hence,
NR > NU.
To show that R
i and U
i both increase as compared to no regulation in either locality,
note that without regulation the population in each community would be N=2 with prots
U
i (N=2). Then by the monotonicity of the prot schedule in n, U(NU < N=2) >
U(N=2), and by the equal prots' condition, R
i (NR) = U
i (NU) > U
i (N=2). Done.
This result indicates the importance of decentralized regulation and its impact on
the neighborhood locality. We can show that the results are easily generalizable to any
number of localities. As the number of localities with sanctions grows, the whole system
Pareto improves. This is because in the regulated locality per person prots increase
due to the sanctioning mechanism, while in the unregulated localities per person prots
increase due to smaller population, hence lower appropriation.
3.2 Endogenous institutions and free mobility
Now consider internal equilibrium (voting with the ballot) where each community
decides on the regulatory structure by majority voting (e.g., Fiorina and Plott, 1978).
We show that the regulatory regime can be sustained for both localities in a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium. Again, everyone chooses a locality rst. Next, each member of
the community votes either for sanctions or no sanctions in their locality, and the outcome
is determined by majority voting. Third, each agent decides on his/her harvesting level.
In the communities with the sanctioning regime, monitoring decisions follow.
Proposition 3 In the voting equilibrium, agents vote for sanctions in both localities. The
population sizes in both localities are identical, NR1 = NR2 = N=2.
The result easily follows from the identical agents assumption. By the median voter
theorem (e.g., Downs, 1957) the outcome of the majority voting is the median voter's
preferred institution. By assumption, R
i (n) > U
i (n) for any n  N since monitoring
costs are low. Therefore, sanctions are preferred to no sanctions.
54. Conclusion
Our analysis of the CPR problem with free mobility and exogenous institutions reveals
that the locality with the sanctioning system maintains the socially optimal use level even
under migratory pressure as long as harvesting targets are adjustable according to the
population level. Moreover, a positive externality is captured if we introduce sanctions
in only one locality. This suggests that decentralized regulatory mechanisms for manag-
ing commons such as sheries, grasslands, forests, irrigation systems may be introduced
gradually. With an endogenous choice of institutions, where agents choose between no
regulation or sanctioning system by majority rule, equilibrium yields institutions with
sanctions in both localities as long as monitoring costs are low. Thus, we nd that decen-
tralized sanctioning mechanism with perfect enforcement may be Pareto improving. This
contrasts with De Meza and Gould (1992) study where an enclosure may be inecient due
to costly enforcement of property rights. Our model has several extensions. In reality,
users may trespass and appropriate resource both in their own locality where they do
live and in the other locality. Then agents, who do live in the unregulated locality and
harvest in the regulated locality, will have no punishment, which may ignite \race to the
bottom" in both localities. This mirrors the local public good provision with spillovers
(Bloch and Zenginobuz, 2006). Another extension relates to costly mobility, i.e. migra-
tion decision creates additional costs in comparison with free mobility. Also we may relax
an assumption of identical agents in cost, which may bring interesting sorting dynamics
with respect to voting outcome (Gurerk et al. 2006). Depending on the distribution of
types, equilibrium may yield sanctions or no sanctions. Further, heterogeneity of agents
in other-regarding preferences may trigger antisocial punishment (Herrmann et al. 2008)
which may lower the welfare of the community.
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